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Among the contributions to the 1974 winter issue of Journal of Canadian 
Fiction, the reader was pleasantly impressed to encounter David Sheps's article 
on St. Urbain's Horseman by Mordecai Richler.1 The publication of this essay 
was welcome indeed, for it focused interest on a novel which in spite of its 
unanimously recognized accomplishments and significance has only minimally 
been the object of critical investigation so far. Though primarily concerned 
with the theme of the vicarious, the study calls attention to the complexity of 
the structure underlying Richler's work. The present essay would like to 
continue where Mr. Sheps has voluntarily stopped, and make fully explicit 
the major structural characteristic of St. Urbain's Horseman, i.e., the selection 
of the temporal element as the basic psychological and methodological principle. 
The major premise of Richler's novel is that the concept of the self is 
inseparable from the concept of time, that both man's organic and his psycho-
logical development is predicated on time. The author's approach is also based 
on the observation that the time of human experience is different from the 
concept of time in nature; one major distinction being the fact that events 
of real importance for the psyche do not follow in a systematic chronological 
order, but enjoy an unequal distribution within a span of time objectively 
measured. However, what might be called the discontinuous in terms of clocks 
and calendars is the psychologically continuous, for apparently disparate events 
converge towards the unique point of the momentary experience, and what 
happens to a man in one particular instant of his life is in resonance with 
what has already happened to him at other different times. Between moments 
of life, the mind identifies a fundamental sameness, and recognizes in it its 
own existence unfolding in time; hence, a memory formed not by habit, but 
one consisting of significant events, discloses the coherent structure of the self 
which cannot be recovered if only present experience is considered. Richler in 
quest of Jake Hersh's self is therefore in quest of his memory, and, indeed, 
with the exception of a few pages dedicated to the trial and narrated by the 
author, St. Urbain's Horseman consists of Jake's recollections in connection with 
this important occurence in his life.2 
In Richler's novel however, not only memories are ascribed a special 
function in the search for the self. The fantasies and metaphors constituting 
the structural landmarks of a person's imagination are also outstandingly relevant 
psychological data, for they refer to a preeminently value-charged aspect of 
subjective existence. And if "the Horseman" as a metaphor is Jake Hersh's 
leading statement of identity, Richler considers his responsibility not only to 
mention its presence, but also to account for the manner in which it was 
produced. 
But how can this constant resonance between memory, imagination, and 
momentary experience be conveyed? Richler's solution to the problem is 
simple but brilliant: he uses temporal cubism. The author places himself in 
one particular moment in the life of his protagonist, and, by means of his 
protagonist's recollections, allows the reader to view the central event from a 
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large number of points of temporal perspective. In other words, what a 
cubist painter does with space, Richler does with time. Indeed, he spatializes 
the present by making it the point of confluence of incidents which exhibit 
dynamic association and interpénétration, precisely the qualities which are signifi-
cant for the relationship between time and the self. Temporal cubism, there-
fore, is designed to catch this dynamic interaction of events in a formalized 
system, i.e., to reveal at once the co-presence of temporal elements in the making 
up of the self, and the functional unity of the psyche. Accordingly, Richler's 
protagonist is not a fixed structure, nor is he a passive recorder, but a constant 
interpreter, organizer, and synthesizer. He is a distinct pattern of responses 
and associations called Jake Hersh. 
Jake Hersh is a Jew from Montreal, and what might be termed the 
Jewish component of his psyche emerges from the exploration of a number 
of incidents chronologically disconnected. As a child living in Canada at the 
time of the Second World War, he has first hand experience of anti-Semitic 
discrimination on the part of certain French Canadians. As an adolescent 
travelling to America, he is informed that some of the Nazis responsible for 
the Jewish holocaust are still in office in West Germany. These incidents 
stored in the deep layers of his mental soil render him particularly sensitive 
to the terrible realities disclosed years later by the Frankfurt proceedings against 
Nazi criminals, and Jake Hersh finds himself walking in the streets of Munich 
seized with the desire to shout: "Murderers, murderers."3 Yet, he is well 
enough read and educated to remember that Kant, Mozart, and Brecht are 
German names, and therefore to feel obliged to weigh the contribution 
brought to the world by some Germans against the abnormalities committed 
by others. So, on one hand, he concludes that hatred being a matter of 
discipline "he would have to train harder" and hate, and on the other, sees 
sense in the statement of a young American girl that the Germans are excellent 
people, and that Germany is the right country for her (p. 245). 
When the German problem does not constitute a point of reference, Jake 
Hersh's emotional response to his own race is also dual in nature. While 
admitting, for instance, that a measure of unity was necessary for the Jews 
in Montreal in order to survive as a minority under conditions of anti-Semitism, 
he resents profoundly the absurdly clannish attitude exhibited by the Hershes, 
and, though he does not cherish the illusion that anti-Semitic sentiments have 
disappeared from the world, he considers that the time has come to fight them 
not by building higher walls around the ghetto, but by pulling them down 
and meeting the rest of humanity. This is why he rejoices when the state of 
Israel wins the Six Day War, yet sincerely worries about Arab civil rights in 
the same country. 
Of equal importance for the reconstruction of Jake Hersh's self are the 
temporal angles from which the building of his social consciousness is con-
sidered. Again, the events which Richler chooses to present are disparate 
and disconnected chronologically, yet again, they function as resonant elements 
for the present, for they too obey the logic of significant associations. Very 
early in his childhood Jake witnesses social discrimination and injustice in his 
own family. The following years supply him with manifold information regarding 
the millions of oppressed people in the world, and, on one occasion, a Time 
editorial even confronts him with the undisputable proclamation: "While you're 
eating your dinner tonight, 417 people will die of starvation" (p. 356). As a 
result, when he finally shoots his first film, the happiness produced by this 
dream come true is severely marred by his awareness that "the energy he and 
others had expended, the one million two hundred thousand dollars they had 
consumed, could have been used much more beneficially providing shelter 
for the homeless, food for the hungry" (p. 272). 
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At this point, it is extremely important to notice that Jake Hersh's sense 
of Jewishness and his social consciousness are inextricably connected. What 
Jake calls his "Jewish nightmare"—"the terror that took him by surprise"— 
significantly struck "only on those rare evenings when he brimmed with well 
being," or, equally, when he spent happy moments with his family on the 
beach of their rented cottage (p. 65). It is at these particular moments that 
he fears his happiness endangered by all the "injustice collectors" in the world, 
by all the insulted and the injured, who come to ask him for an accounting 
(p. 81). And if he imagines this general attack under the form of Nazi 
tactics, it is because only then his Jewish background manifests itself. The 
importance of the word "only" in Richler's text cannot be emphasized enough, 
for it is this word and its implications that raise his work from Jewish parochialism 
into human universality. Indeed, St. Urbain's Horseman does not depict a Jewish 
experience, but the experience of a man who happens to be a Jew. Jake 
Hersh's fear is a general fear expressed through a Canadian-Jewish particular, 
and Richler's art pulls the reader away from any specific context and towards 
the center of the experience itself. 
Jake Hersh's traumas and perplexities are undoubtedly those of everyman; 
yet, unlike some people, unlike his friend Luke Scott, for instance, who has 
concluded that the whole world being on the Titanic, the only question is 
in which class one travels down, Jake is basically an idealist with a profoundly 
humanistic outlook on life. At a time when his contemporaries find it difficult 
to believe in anything, he believes in "those who were truly great, those who 
were nearer the sun" (p. 283). His resistance to a meaningless existence, 
his desperate attempt to establish consistency and significance in a life which 
apparently lacks both these qualities is made explicit by "the Horseman," 
the metaphor which embodies not only his wish to emancipate himself from a 
limiting sense of Jewishness, but also his desire for social and political justice. 
But to find a metaphor is no more than to extricate an aspect of one's 
true self from impression into expression. As such, "the Horseman" constitutes 
an irreducible essence of Jake's personality, and in order to reveal its gradual 
construction, Richler again relies heavily on temporal cubism. Three events 
seem to be of particular importance. First, the initial impression which goes 
back to the year 1943, when, due to a number of circumstances, Jake singles 
out his cousin Joey as exactly the opposite of what he considers hateful in 
the rest of the Hershes: success, adventure, and action, as opposed to petty 
humbleness, clannish immobility, and passive acceptance. The next important 
event occurs when Jake is informed that his cousin was in Spain in 1939, 
and when in spite of warnings that Joey was, in fact, running away from 
troubles with American gangsters, he persuades himself that his cousin actually 
fought in the Spanish Civil War. The third and decisive moment takes place 
when Jake discovers Joey's temporary stay in Israel, and when, despite the 
disturbing facts regarding Joey's conduct, he again chooses to believe only that 
his cousin fought in the battle for Jerusalem, and that he eventually left 
the country because it no longer corresponded to his ideal. At this point 
a profound relationship is established between Joey as an external object 
and Jake's consciousness. Jake recognizes equivalence, and, through a mimetic 
operation, creates "the Horseman," Joey's spiritualized equivalent.4 The 
metaphor thus discovered grasps Jake fully. Not only does it become his 
moral editor, but also, potentially, his supreme adviser. "Oh, Horseman, 
Horseman, where are you?" Jake Hersh will often inquire, craving for 
answers and certainties (p. 282). 
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When a metaphor is created, the human being rises beyond the object 
which originated it, and substitutes its ideal image. Unfortunately, Jake's 
spiritual motion does not pause in that stage, but descends back to the 
object and identifies it with the metaphor itself. From Joey to the Horseman, 
and back to Joey is the itinerary followed by his mind, and this heresy 
is signalled by Richler through the use of both purely linguistic and other 
artistic devices. Preceding the word "Horseman" with the qualifying "St. 
Urbain's" he coins the phrase "St. Urbain's Horseman" designating Joey, in 
opposition to "the Horseman" denominating the metaphor, and simultaneously 
uses Jake's attic aerie as a literary notation for the abused ideal image. 
Indeed, the attic aerie is a shrine Jake builds not to "the Horseman," but 
to "St. Urbain's Horseman," not to the metaphor, but to the cousin. Here the 
walls are covered by photographs retrieved from Joey's file, and here he stores 
Joey's papers, riding habit, and saddle. It is also here that the clock on the 
wall indicates the time in Paraguay, Doctor Mengele's time, for by the same 
descending movement of the spirit by which he identified Joey as the here, 
Jake singled out this former Nazi doctor as the villain. And his obsession with 
Mengele is of such profusion, that nothing can persuade him of the absurdity 
of the idea that once the Nazi doctor is punished, justice is done for all his 
concentration camp victims. As a result, whenever he thinks of his cousin, 
he imagines him doing what he would like him to do: riding a Pleven stallion, 
for, "when a Jew gets on a horse he stops being a Jew," galloping, thundering, 
and punishing Mengele (p. 31). In fact, Jake's desire to cling to this image of 
Joey is so fervent, that he systematically disregards all evidence that could be 
detrimental to it, till he finally reaches the point that the less satisfaction he 
experiences in his life, the more he thinks and talks about his cousin. 
Certainly, the legitimate question is, why this almost insane belief in a 
man despite all evidence, and despite the fact that in his lucid moments Jake 
himself has the realization that his adventure with "St. Urbain's Horseman" is 
leading him to ruin? The painful truth is that Jake needs his idealized cousin, 
for, while he is fundamentally right in his social and political perceptions, he 
is essentially weak when concrete action is needed. Torn between disgust of 
the system and desire to belong to it, Jake Hersh is able to pass hard judgments, 
but is unable to act accordingly. And it is this very incapacity that obliges 
him to use Joey as his self-justifying image: to have him exhibit attitudes he 
himself should exhibit, to have him perform acts he himself should perform. 
Jake himself admits this terrible flaw in his character, and is fully aware that 
his complacency renders him a mere provider like any of his despised uncles, 
that in the absence of a serious commitment, his life is "ultimately self-serving 
and cocooned by money" (p. 81). Indeed, even when he attempts to live up 
to his own expectations, the most he can do is not to go on a trip to Spain 
because the Spanish government has fascist inclinations, or, as a director, 
consort not with leading actors, but with has-beens and never-beens. 
Nowhere, however, is his inconsistency rendered more evident than in what 
might be called his cinema-fantasies. Unreal as far as actual performance is 
concerned, these acts of imagination are highly realistic psychologically, for they 
represent an enormous condensation of time and experience. Outstanding 
among them is the fantasy in which Jake casts his own funeral. In attendance 
are his wife, his best friend, and his two children. Most characteristically, 
Molly is married to a Black Panther, but Sammy is Lord Samuel Hersh with 
a mansion in Belgravia. Jake's desire for social justice is therefore satisfied, 
for his daughter has espoused one of the most discriminated against minorities; 
but the comforts of the establishment are there too, for his son is well-off 
and an aristocrat in addition. The reader remembers a moment, distant in 
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time, yet succinctly advancing Richler's own comment on the dualities disputing 
Jake's frame of mind. Jake and Harry are drinking; Jake hopefully suspects 
himself of social integrity, but Harry reassures him in a friendly fashion: 
"Don't worry. You're rotten" (p. 350). 
After the various dislocations of the time sequence throughout the novel, 
one observes the final actions of the story unrolling in their chronological 
order, till the moment comes when Jake Hersh is informed of the death of his 
cousin. The moment is crucial, for not only does Jake experience a profound 
depression, but also feels the moral obligation to become "St. Urbain's Horse-
man" himself, if the idea of "the Horseman" is to endure. But this is precisely 
what he cannot, or will not do, and, in view of what the author has already 
disclosed about his past, Jake's next movement is at once retrospective and 
prospective. Like a drowning man clinging to a straw, Jake clings to his 
aunt's refusal to believe in the death of her son, and though fully aware of the 
absurdity of his attitude, climbs to his attic aerie, retrieves "the Horseman's 
journal," and replaces the entry regarding Joey's death with the words: 
"presumed dead" (p. 436). The circle is thus completed, and Jake Hersh is 
left there where he was found in the first chapter: journeying between his 
bedroom and his attic aerie, oscillating between the symbol of a system he thinks 
he hates, and that of an ideal he is unable to pursue. The initial moment of 
the book revealed him waking up; the final one discloses him going back to 
sleep, and then, what Richler calls "stock-taking time" has come for the reader. 
The book is closed with the conviction that Mordecai Richler's work 
represents a notable contribution to the discovery and understanding of the 
self, and that the structure which the author designed for his novel reflects 
the idea that time being an irradicable factor in the universal condition of life, 
a temporal index must necessarily enter into the study of man. Indeed, what 
one commonly calls the self is experienced only against the background of 
the individual's life, a life defined not only as an objective structure of temporal 
movements, but also as a subjective associative network. In order to capture 
this plurality of aspects, the significance of which consists only in its totality, 
Richler uses a method analogous to space perspective. His temporal cubism 
discloses Jake Hersh's personality not as a sum total of past impressions, but 
as the result of a process of interpénétration whose essence is illuminated by 
"the Horseman," the denominating metaphor. And if the greatest part of the 
novel happens in Jake Hersh's memory, it is because Richler is aware that the 
unified structure of the self, inaccessible if the individual is observed only in a 
momentary manifestation, can be restored through recollections. But the 
Canadian author is not imitating Proust. Jake's trial is not Marcel's biscuit 
and cup of tea. Having triggered memories, it does not disappear, and the 
book does not move backwards. On the contrary, the trial is the extensive 
present of the novel, and into this present the past is summoned to render it 
intelligible. 
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